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We demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty! 
Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy  
 
Chi parla male, pensa male e vive male. Bisogna trovare 
le parole giuste: le parole sono importanti!(Who speaks 
poorly, thinkspoorly and lives poorly. Weoughtto find the 
right words: words are important!) 
Nanni Moretti, Bianca (movie), 1989 
 
 
Definitions provide a shared knowledge and a common understanding of a topic.Agreed 
definitions are necessary for communication and interconnected activities. This is relevant 
when talking, writing or reading about science.  
Definitions can serve a variety of different functions, which are not mutually 
exclusive:nominal, taxonomic, descriptive and explicative.The meaning of a noun should 
allow all speakers and users of the same language to represent and think the same object in 
the same way.By providing either an unambiguous description of the intended phenomenon 
or a grounded interpretation of its underlying causes, each definition should permit a clear 
identification and classification of the referent objects. Such lucidity in the use of language is 
a joy (Hoffman, 1989). In neuropsychology, as well as in all other scientific domains, 
definitions should suggest clear labels and classifications, but should avoid explanations and 
avert referencing to specific theories or models to prevent failures in communication or 
hurdles to further investigations and discoveries.  
The label “semantic paraphasia” designs errors in spontaneous speech and oral naming,in 
which the intended word is substituted by a semantically related word. This definition refers 
to a well-defined category of errors, which does not include either spelling and reading errors 
(labeled paragraphias and paralexias, respectively) orerrors with a different target-response 
relationship (e.g., formal similarity). It is well known that semantic errors can arise from 
different loci of cognitive impairment and reflect different processing levels (Caramazza and 
Hillis, 1990). However, this definition is theoretically neutral, as it does not suggest any 
account of the underlying causes and mechanisms.  
Incomplete, ambiguousor idiosyncratic definitions can preclude communication, thus 
harmingthinking and the possibility to detectunexpected phenomenaor to explore 
newtopics.Here are three examples illustrating the problems deriving from the lack of precise 
definitions. 
(i) One the most popular definition of unilateral spatial neglect states that it is “a 
failure to report, respond, or orient to contralateral stimuli that is not caused by an 
elemental sensorimotor deficit” (Heilman et al., 2000). This definition 
encompasses all the negative signs of neglect, but disregards productive 
phenomena, such as allochiria (Vallar et al., 2006), as they were then not related 
to neglect.  
(ii) Phonemic paraphasiasare usually defined as errors involving “the reordering, 
omission, or addition of correctly pronounced phonemes” (Shallice, 1988, p. 58). 
According to this definition, the erroneous response, i.e. the resulting phonemic 
sequence, can beeither a word (e.g., dog  fog) or a non-word (e.g., dog vog), 
indifferently. Nevertheless, some authors (for instance Lesser, 1978),called 
phonemic paraphasiaonly the non-word responses in which the target wordis 
identifiable. When the response is a phonologically related word, (i.e., with 
similar form but not similar meaning), the error is assigned to a different category 
and called "formal verbal paraphasia”. Lecours et al. (1983) maintained that 
“verbal paraphasias of a formal type constitute a particular category of phonemic 
paraphasias” (p. 43),but errors limited to formal paraphasiashave been described 
in individual patients (e.g.,Blanken, 1990), suggesting that word responses may 
reflect different impaired mechanisms. The uncertainty in classifying wrong 
responsesinto alternative classes can lead to errors in interpretation and diagnosis. 
(iii) Traditionally, limb apraxia comprises ideational and ideomotor forms. This 
distinction has different meaningsfor different authors: for Morlaas (1928) it 
distinguishes differentgestures types (transitive and intransitive), for 
Hécaen(1972) different levels of gestures complexity (complex and simple),for De 
Renzi (1985)different tasks (production on commandandimitation). The same 
label is hence used to refer to different clinical performances. 
We need to discuss the referential function of names and to acquire a clearer view of our use 
of labels and definitions. This endeavour is independent from the theoretical modelsproposed 
to account for observed phenomena. Following Locke(1690), who introduced the notion of 
“nominal essence” as the “abstract Idea to which the Name is annexed”, we should address 
the issue of nominal essence or nominal definition in neuropsychology. 
From this volume, within the Discussion Forum section of Cortex, we plan to publish 
definitions of terms used in neuropsychology parlance. Each entry will aim at describing a 
term used in neuropsychology listing the distinctive features but ignoring the associated 
characteristics which may be important clinically or scientifically, yet do not stipulate a 
definition. Typically, neuroanatomical localizations are significant but they do not necessarily 
serve to define a term.  
A definition should be different from a brief entry in an encyclopaedia or a very brief review. 
It is an explicit and strict assertion, with no examples or ambiguous terms, allowing the 
precise identification of the target clinical picture, sign or behaviour. Further, since 
neuropsychological deficits may show multifarious phenomena, a definition should state that 
x or y are possible features of a given symptom or syndrome, not that they always present 
withx or y. A definition should aim at the best common denominator offering a term allowing 
everybody using it to understand the same thing. A definition is the best possible relationship 
between a name and a thing. 
Each definition will be the result of a discussion among experts to reach a common 
denominator agreed by most if not all. This procedure aims at excluding from each definition, 
controversial aspects of the entries, personal takes or conflicting hypotheses.Definitions will 
therefore be conservative and subject to change should new, pertinent evidence emerge. 
We accept that these definitional attempts will not be perfect, but hope that they would go a 
long way in avoiding the use of implicit definitions conducive of misunderstanding and 
confusion. It is inevitable that some of you will enthusiastically consent with this initiative, 
whereas others will be more critical. Anybody willing can take part. Please submit proposals 
or preliminary drafts for entries to Cortex office (cortex@ed.ac.uk). Definitions can apply to 
syndromes, symptoms, signs, paradigms, procedures or neuroanatomy relevant to 
neuropsychology. When sending a proposal for a definition, please try also suggesting a short 
list of colleagues who may help in refining this definition, until consensus is reached. 
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